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RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
Ukraine v. Russia: Passage
through Kerch Strait and the
Sea of Azov
Part I: The Legal Status of Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov
On 16 September 2016, Ukraine instituted arbitral proceedings against
Russia  under  Part  XV  and  Annex  VII  of  the  1982  United  Nations
Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOS)  in  the  Dispute
Concerning Coastal  State  Rights  in  the Black Sea,  Sea of  Azov,  and
Kerch Strait (Ukraine v. the Russian Federation).  The case relates to
Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, which fundamentally disrupted
the maritime order in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. While the
exact  content  of  Ukraine’s  claims  is  not  publicly  known,  it  is
understood (see statements here, here, here, here and here) that they
include Russia’s ongoing construction of a bridge across Kerch Strait
and restrictions on passage of Ukrainian vessels through Kerch Strait
and the Sea of Azov (third States’ vessels are also affected, but would
not be part of the Ukrainian claim). Kerch Strait Bridge is intended to
create a land connection between Crimea and Krasnodar region which,
in light of Ukraine’s blockade of Crimea, is crucial  for supplies from
Russia.
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In  three  consecutive  posts,  we will  map some legal  issues  that  the
arbitral  tribunal  might  face  in  the  context  of  Ukrainian  rights  of
passage and Russia’s challenge of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction – if
these issues indeed form part of Ukraine’s application. Our first post
provides some context and addresses the question of the legal status
of Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. Our second post deals with the
issue of potential Ukrainian passage rights, most of which depend on
the legal status discussed in the first post. In our third and final post,
we examine the impact of these substantive findings on the question of
the  arbitral  tribunal’s  jurisdiction  ratione  materiae  over  Ukraine’s
corresponding claims.
Of course, it  is beyond the scope of our contribution to provide an
exhaustive analysis of all  relevant facts and law and to arrive at any
final conclusions. We do, however, intend to point to some of the most
intricate legal questions and trigger further debate on an interesting
case that –in our view– deserves more attention by commentators. We
would also like to point out that we will refrain from discussing the
question of whether Crimea remains Ukrainian territory or has been
lawfully incorporated into Russia as a matter of public international
law. Instead, we will – for the purposes of this analysis – accept the
predominant view that the former is the case.
The Sea of Azov and the Importance of Kerch Strait for Navigation
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The Sea of Azov is a small,  shallow sea connected to the Black Sea.
Kerch Strait, which is the only connection between the Azov Sea and
the Black Sea,  is  located between Kerch peninsula  in  the West  and
Taman peninsula in the East.  While the former peninsula is  part  of
Crimea, the latter is located in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai. Kerch Strait is
approximately  45  km  in  length  and,  at  its  narrowest  point  at  the
northern end of  Chushka landspit,  only about 3–5 km wide.  Kerch-
Yenikalsky canal, which was first built in 1877 and used to be operated
by Ukraine, is the only waterway through Kerch Strait that is navigable
by large ships. Smaller vessels can use the Russian fairway passages
#50 and #52 situated east of the canal.
Reportedly, more than 8.000 mostly (but not exclusively) Russian and
Ukrainian ships used to pass through Kerch Strait in an average year
prior  to  2014.  This  reportedly  secured  at  least  USD  80  million  of
revenues for the providers of pilotage services in Kerch seaport. After
the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian Ministry of
Infrastructure  adopted  an  order  which  closed  all  Crimean  ports,
including two ports on the banks of the Kerch Strait (Kerch Fishing
Seaport and Crimea port).  These measures significantly reduced  the
number of vessels entering Crimean ports. For example, as part of its
non-recognition policy, the EU has banned vessels flying the flag of EU
member States “from making any payments to the Port Authority of
Kerch and the Port Authority of Sevastopol”. Ukraine also reported to
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that it is no longer able
to guarantee safety of navigation in the ports of the peninsula and the
adjacent waters.
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Picture 1: Traffic in the Sea of Azov on 9 November 2017 (Source: Marine
Traffic).
Picture  2:  Traffic  through  Kerch  Strait  on  9  November  2017  (Source:
Marine Traffic).
Legal Status of Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov before 1991
In  his  treatise  “The  Law  of  Territorial  Waters  and  Maritime
Jurisdiction” published in 1927, Philip C. Jessup considered that a claim
to the Sea of Azov as part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’
(USSR)  territorial  sea  “seems  reasonable  and  […]  would  not  be
contested”  (at  p.  383).  Until  1991,  the  Sea  of  Azov  fulfilled  the
requirements of a “bay the coasts of which belong to a single State”
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within  the  meaning  of  Article  7  of  the  1958  Convention  on  the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (CTSCZ) and today’s Article 10
UNCLOS. Accordingly, the USSR drew a bay closing line across Kerch
Strait (see here and here), connecting Cape Kyz-Aul and Cape Zhelezny
Rog – and declared the Sea of Azov internal waters. Consequently, it
was  unnecessary  for  the  USSR  to  also  claim  the  Sea  of  Azov  as  a
“historic bay” (for which kind of bay no written rules exist, see Article
7(6)  CTSCZ  and  Article  10(6)  UNCLOS).  As  one  author  has  put  it:
“[S]ome ‘claims’ categorised as being ‘historic’ today – such as the Sea
of Azoz [sic!] – were probably misnamed or at least loosely entitled as
‘historic’, because they were – even at the time of the inception of the
‘claim’  –  in  any  case  internal  waters  in  the  light  of  then-existent
international  law  or  at  least  constituted  ‘ancient  rights’”  (Clive
Symmons,  Historic  Waters  in  the  Law  of  the  Sea:  A  Modern  Re-
Appraisal, 2008, p. 299).
Legal Status of Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov after 1991
When Ukraine declared its independence on 24 August 1991 (see also
1991  Agreement  establishing  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent
States), its sovereignty extended to most of the Western shore of the
Sea of Azov including Crimea, which borders Kerch Strait (Crimea had
been  ceded  to  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic  in  1954).  A
maritime boundary between Russia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov was
not, however, established and the issue remained a point of contention
between  the  two  States.  Notably,  Ukraine  unilaterally  proclaimed  a
boundary  line  in  Kerch  Strait  in  1999  which  would  have  put  Tuzla
Island on the Ukrainian side of the strait. There are also signs that at
least Ukraine may have considered (or was going to consider) parts of
the Sea of Azov as its territorial sea rather than as internal waters. For
example, a 2002 Draft Law on Inland Water, the Territorial Sea and the
adjacent  zone  of  Ukraine  defined  the  territorial  sea  of  Ukraine  as
including Ukraine’s coastal waters in the Sea of Azov within a breadth
of  12  nautical  miles  (Article  2).  However,  this  draft  law  was  never
adopted,  because  Russia  put  further  pressure  on  Ukraine  by
unilaterally initiating the construction of a dam between the Russian
coast and Tuzla Island in 2003.
That year, the negotiations gained new momentum. Russia and Ukraine
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not  only  concluded  the  Treaty  Between  Ukraine  and  the  Russian
Federation on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border but also settled part
of their maritime differences in an Agreement on Cooperation on the
Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait (Cooperation Agreement)
(we  provide  an  unofficial  translation  here).  The  Cooperation
Agreement  left  the  question  of  delimitation  to  a  future  separate
agreement (Article  1),  which was,  however,  never concluded despite
ongoing negotiations (for details, see Alexander Skaridov, The Sea of
Azov and the Kerch Straits, in: David D. Caron and Nilufer Oral (eds.),
Navigating Straits (2014), pps. 221 ff.). In addition, Article 1 Cooperation
Agreement  proclaimed that  the  Sea  of  Azov  and  Kerch  Strait  were
“internal waters” of Russia and Ukraine (but note that Skaridov doubts
that this was actually meant as a legal rather than a geographical or
historical term). In a Joint Statement by the President of Ukraine and
the President of the Russian Federation on the Sea of Azov and the
Strait of Kerch of 24 December 2003 (for a translation, see Law of the
Sea Bulletin 54 (2004), p. 131) both States reiterated the terms of the
Cooperation Agreement and claimed that “historically the Sea of Azov
and the Strait of Kerch are internal waters of Ukraine and Russia”.
These  developments  seem to  have  been  met  with  little  opposition,
which may also  be  owed to  the  Sea  of  Azov’s  little  importance  for
strategic purposes. While Article 10 UNCLOS and Article 7 CTSCZ only
cover bays which belong to one State,  they also do not necessarily
exclude  the  possibility  of  a  multi-State  bay  consisting  of  internal
waters if that regime is based on the consent of all  relevant coastal
States or State practice, even if many commentators take that position.
This question remains one of general international law. An often-used
example of such a bay is that of Ruvuma Bay, which, according to a
1988 treaty between Tanzania and Mozambique,  constitutes  internal
waters of these two States. In many cases, however, attempts to create
such shared border bays have attracted international protests, which,
according  to  some,  calls  into  question  the  existence  of  such  a
customary  rule  (Clive  Symmons,  Article  10  UNCLOS,  in:  Alexander
Proelss  (ed.),  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law of  the  Sea:  A
Commentary, 2017, MN. 21, 29). In the case of the Sea of Azov, it  has
been  argued  that  there  was  no  automatic  transformation  into
territorial  seas  in  1991  and  that  Russia  and  Ukraine  now  share  a
“condominium”  of  internal  waters.  The  idea  of  such  an  “inherited”
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condominium  in  a  multi-State  bay  is  not  entirely  new.  In  its  1992
judgment  in  the  Land,  Island  and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute  (El
Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) held that the Gulf of Fonseca, which was held under the
single control of Spain until  1821, afterwards retained its status as a
“historic  bay”  of  internal  waters  and  was  thus  subject  to  “joint
sovereignty” of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.
In  the  light  of  the  special  circumstances  of  that  case,  it  is  unclear
whether a similar argument can be made with respect to the Sea of
Azov. It could be argued that Russia and Ukraine, after “inheriting” the
bay,  expressly  or  tacitly  consented to keep the original  regime and
later codified this practice in the Cooperation Agreement. However, it
can be doubted whether both States consistently upheld their consent
in light of the lack of any proper shared governance system and the
continuing delimitation dispute in the Sea of Azov. In addition, there
seem to be new indications that Ukraine will distance itself from the
bay regime (if any) in the light of waning chances of a return of Crimea.
On  16  July  2015,  a  group  of  Ukrainian  members  of  parliament
submitted a  Draft  Law on the  Denunciation of  the  Treaty  between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Use of the
Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait which was not, however, adopted. This is
not  surprising  as  Ukraine  apparently  relies  on  the  Cooperation
Agreement  for  both  its  claim that  the  construction  of  Kerch  Strait
Bridge is illegal  and for its passage rights through Kerch Strait  (see
Part  II  of  this  contribution).  In  2016,  a  number  of  Ukrainian  State
agencies requested satellite photos from Ukraine’s State Space Agency,
naming part of Sea of Azov Ukraine’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Thus, even if a shared bay regime of internal waters exists in the Sea of
Azov, it might not be here to stay.
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Picture 3: Maritime boundaries in the Sea of Azov in accordance with a
normal  territorial  sea  regime  (potential  contiguous  zone/EEZ
/continental  shelf  claims  remain  undelimited)  (Source:
http://opennauticalchart.org/).
Preliminary Conclusion
In this post, we have argued that there are two possible Scenarios for
the current legal status of Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. Under the
first Scenario these waters are internal waters of Russia and Ukraine as
they form part of a single bay regime that has only later evolved into a
border  bay.  Under  the  second  Scenario,  the  original  bay  regime
dissolved with Ukraine’s independence or thereafter and Kerch Strait
and the Sea of Azov largely are part of the territorial sea of Ukraine
and Russia. In addition, a patch of high seas (or potentially EEZs) exists
in the central Sea of Azov (see Picture 3). While the second Scenario
seems more likely, the following two parts of our contribution will take
both Scenarios into account.
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Ukraine.
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